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1 Introduction
In this paper we argue that there is a problem with the conjunction of David
Lewis’ account of counterfactual conditionals and his account of laws of nature.
This is a pressing problem since both accounts are individually plausible, and
popular.
There is a well-known objection to Lewis’ account of counterfactuals, the
most famous instance of which is the so-called “nuclear button” example due
to Fine (1975). In response to this objection Lewis clarified his original account
of counterfactuals. What we show is that Lewis’ modified account is incongru-
ent with his account of laws of nature.
We proceed as follows. We start by setting out Lewis’ account of counter-
factuals. We then present the objection and Lewis’ response thereto. We then
set out Lewis’ account of laws of nature. Finally we show in what sense the
two accounts, of counterfactuals and of laws of nature, are incongruent.
2 Counterfactuals
You are holding a ball in front of you. You are considering letting go of it.
As a matter of fact you do not let go of the ball: you hold it stationary, arm
outstretched. Now, consider the following two counterfactuals:
(i) If you had let go of this ball, it would have dropped to the floor.
(ii) If you had let go of this ball, it would have turned into a badger.
The first is true and the second is false. Why? Both have the same logical
form so it must be a difference in the semantics that accounts for the difference
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in truth value. Lewis famously gave an account of the semantics of counterfac-
tual conditionals in terms of possible worlds, and, more specifically, the relative
similarity of various possible worlds to the actual world (Lewis, 1973).1
Here is what his theory says about our examples. Consider (i) first. Let’s
formalise this sentence as “L F”. Consider the possible worlds where you
did in fact let go of the ball; worlds where L is true. Call these ‘L-worlds’.2
And consider also possible worlds where the ball drops to floor; worlds
where F is true. Call these ‘F-worlds’. The truth-value of (i) depends on the
relative similarity – the closeness – of different L-worlds to the actual world, as
follows: (i) is true iff there is a L ∧ F-world closer to the actual world than any
L ∧ ¬F-world.
Now consider (ii). Formalise it as ‘L B’, and consider again L-worlds
but this time also B-worlds, worlds where the ball turns into a badger. Once
again the truth-value of the counterfactual depends on the relative similarity
– the closeness – of different L-worlds to the actual world but this time it is
the L ∧ B-worlds and L ∧ ¬B-worlds which are salient: (ii) is true iff there is a
L ∧ B-world closer to the actual world than any L ∧ ¬B-world.
Intuition deems (i) true because we think that a world in which the ball is
let go and drops is a world similar to our own, while a world where the ball
does not drop when let go is somehow odd, deviant, far removed. On the
other hand intuition deems (ii) false precisely because we think that a world in
which the ball is let go of and turns into an badger is odd, deviant, far removed.
Lewis’ account is compelling because it captures these intuitions in a clear and
systematic way, or so it is claimed.
For the general case of a counterfactual like “A  C” the analysis takes
this form:
• A  C is true iff the closest A ∧ C-world is closer than all A ∧ ¬C-
worlds.
This sketch of the analysis obviously leaves many of the details under-
explored, but it suffices for the present purpose of setting up the problem with
which we are concerned. The important point for the coming discussion is that
the truth-value of counterfactuals turns on a notion of similarity – or closeness –
of possible worlds.
1The foundations of this account of the semantics of counterfactuals goes back to Stalnaker
(1968), but it is Lewis’ elaboration of it that will be of interest to us in what follows.
2As is well-known Lewis advocated a ‘counterpart’ theory of possible worlds. So strictly speak-
ing the possible worlds to consider are not worlds where you do something, but, rather, where your
counterpart does something. (Whether this is the right account is not our concern.) For convenience,
we’ll gloss over this and we’ll speak in the ‘identity mode’ throughout.
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3 A Flaw in the Analysis
It quickly became apparent that there was a flaw with Lewis’ analysis of coun-
terfactuals.3 Let’s consider this flaw with respect to our example. Lewis’ ac-
count made counterfactual (i) true by virtue of the intuitive claim that there is
a world in which you let go of the ball and the ball drops which is closer than
all other worlds in which you let go and the ball does not drop. That is, worlds
where you let go of the ball and it drops are less odd, deviant, or far-removed
than worlds where you let go and the ball does not drop. But consider the
following specific possible world. It is like the actual world up to the time at
which you did not let go of the ball. This sounds odd but recall that in the actual
world you considered letting go of the ball but didn’t. In the possible world
under consideration, at the time of deliberation you do the opposite–you do let
go. But at this possible world, once you let go of it, the ball stays where it was.
It just hovers there, exactly as if you were still holding it.
There are a lot of possible worlds floating about, so let us take stock. We are
interested in the counterfactual (i) formalised L F: “If you had let go of the
ball, it would have dropped to the floor”. The following possible worlds are
relevant to the analysis.
(a) The actual world: you do not let go of the ball but hold it stationary. This
is a ¬L ∧ ¬F-world.
(b) The standard world: the world where you let go of the ball and it falls to
the ground. This is a L ∧ F-world.
(c) The deviant world: the world where you let go of the ball but it stays in
the same position as it does in (a). This is an L ∧ ¬F-world.
At (c), L is true; (c) is a L-world. But (c) is constructed4 in such a way as to
be like the actual world – (a) – in all other respects. So, for example, once your
fingers stretch out and straighten, your arm stays in the same place, and you
don’t otherwise move. The ball stays just as it was before you let go: it hovers
in the same position unchanging, even down to the distribution of pressure on
its surface that your hand caused before, and down further still! (c) is exactly
like (a) except for whatever needs to be different to make L come out true. As
we’ll say, (c) is maximally similar excepting L to the actual world.
Intuitively, counterfactual (i) is true, and Lewis’ account must do justice
to this. Under Lewis’ account, for counterfactual (i) to be true requires (b) to
be closer to the actual world, (a), than any world where I let go and the ball
does not drop (any L ∧ ¬F-world). That is, under Lewis’ account, (b), which
is a L ∧ F-world, needs to be closer to the actual world, (a), than any L ∧ ¬F-
world. However, (c) is a L ∧ ¬F-world which appears to be closer to (a) than
3The most well-known instance is due to Kit Fine (Fine (1975), see also Bennett (1984)). How-
ever, the objection is general; we present it in terms of our example.
4Of course, if modal realism is true then (c) is not ‘constructed’ but is, rather, ‘sitting out there’.
Nothing hangs on this. Modal realists can think of ‘constructing’ a possible world as merely di-
recting one’s attention to a possible world.
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(b). Indeed (c) is in a sense maximally similar excepting L to the actual world. So
it seems like under Lewis’ account, counterfactual (i) comes out false, contrary
to the intuition to which his account must do justice.
It should be clear that nothing hangs on the specifics of the example. Here’s
a general recipe for finding such deviant worlds.
• Take any supposedly true counterfactual with a false antecedent A C.
• Take the A ∧ C-world which allegedly makes the counterfactual true.5
• Concoct a world as follows: “A, but everything else is as if ¬A”. Call this
a deviant world.
• Since ¬A is true in the actual world, it looks like this deviant world has to
be closer to the actual than the world that allegedly made the counterfac-
tual true.
• In this deviant world, C has whatever truth value it has in the actual
world.
• So on Lewis’ account all counterfactuals come out as having the same
truth values as their consequents have in the actual world.
Given that not all counterfactuals have the same truth-values as their con-
sequents have in the actual world, Lewis’ account is seemingly flawed.
4 Similarity and Laws of Nature
Lewis responded to this problem by arguing that the notion of closeness of
worlds used in arguing that these deviant worlds are closer to the actual than
the respective standard worlds is erroneous. They are closer to the actual world
if similarity is measured simply in terms of particular matters of local fact. This
is because such possible worlds are constructed so as to be maximally similar
to the actual world with respect to all those factors that don’t impact on the
antecedent of the conditional. But, Lewis argues, this is the wrong measure of
similarity.
Prompted by Fine’s famous “nuclear button” example (cf. Fine (1975)), which
is a particularly dramatic instance of the general problem discussed above,
Lewis constructed a hierarchy of respects in which worlds can be similar or
dissimilar. Lewis’ claim is that a similarity relation respecting this hierarchy
doesn’t make the deviant possible world closer to the actual world than the
relevant A ∧ C-world that is to make A C true.
How so? In short, Lewis’ hierarchy ties similarity to the laws of nature. The
worlds closest to the actual world are those which have the same unviolated
5Lewis’ analysis isn’t committed to their being a single such world. That is, Lewis was not
committed to the Uniqueness assumption. We talk in terms of “the” possible world, but everything
works just fine if you pick any one of the closest possible worlds.
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laws of nature. The difference between these worlds and the actual world are
just differences between mere contingent facts, differences which do not in-
volve violation of laws at all. Further are worlds that have the same laws but
differ only in some “small miracle” – some minor violation of the laws. Further
still are worlds in which there are “big miracles” – some major violations of the
laws.6 And furthest are worlds which have different laws altogether. Or better:
worlds where things are so different to the actual world that it stops being use-
ful to characterise these worlds in terms of violations (minor or major) of the
laws at the actual world, but which are better characterised as worlds where
the laws are different (Lewis, 1979).
The deviant L ∧ ¬F-world that seemed to make the intuitively true coun-
terfactual (i) false involves a big miracle to keep the ball hovering there, Lewis
would claim. It involves, inter alia, the violation of the laws of gravity. The
standard L ∧ F-world that makes the intuitively true counterfactual true only
involves the tiny miracle that you chose to drop the ball rather than not.7 So,
as per the hierarchy, the standard L∧ F-world is closer to the actual world than
is the deviant L ∧ ¬F-world. Thus, via the hierarchy Lewis recovers the intu-
itively correct truth-value assignments of counterfactuals.
Clearly laws of nature play a central role in this hierarchy, and, so, play
a central role in determining the truth-values of counterfactuals. Our overall
claim is that Lewis’ conception of laws of nature is incongruent with his ac-
count of counterfactuals in the following sense: Lewis needs to take similarity
in terms of the laws as the important kind of similarity in order for the theory
of counterfactuals to work; however, such a notion of similarity is hard to rec-
oncile with his theory of the laws of nature. To see this we need to examine
Lewis’ account of laws of nature. We turn to this now.
5 Lewis’ Account of Laws of Nature
What is a law of nature? Lewis advocated what is now commonly called the
‘best systems’ account (BSA) of laws of nature in response to this question.8 On
Lewis’ account the laws of nature are generalisations which are the theorems
of that true deductive system which strikes the best balance between simplicity
and strength. Lewis puts it this way:
6Lewis introduced this distinction between small and big miracles, but, of course, this is a mat-
ter of degree not kind. We’ll say more about this in the section 5. Note also that talk of ‘violations’
of laws is, strictly speaking, a façon de parler because on Lewis’ account the laws of nature at a par-
ticular world are true generalisations (of a particular kind) at that world, and true generalisations
cannot be violated. (For that would make them, strictly speaking, false!) This will become clearer
in section 5.
7This involves a miracle, because we are assuming that the histories of the worlds up until the
time of the dropping of the ball are identical and that the world is deterministic.
8This is also known as the ‘MRL account’ (Mill-Ramsey-Lewis) since precursors of the central
idea that Lewis systematised can be found in J.S. Mill and Frank Ramsey. BSA is popular amongst
contemporary philosophers. Cf. Cohen and Callender (2009) for a recent overview and their mod-
ification.
5
Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are sim-
pler, better systematized than others. Some are stronger, more in-
formative, than others. These virtues compete: an uninformative
system can be very simple, an unsystematized compendium of mis-
cellaneous information can be very informative. The best system is
the one that strikes as good a balance as truth will allow between
simplicity and strength. How good a balance that is will depend on
how kind nature is. A regularity is a law iff it is a theorem of the
best system. (Lewis, 1994, p.478).
How are we to understand simplicity and strength, and how they are bal-
anced? Whilst we take it that the concepts are intuitively clear, it is difficult
to give a precise answer to this question. Lewis himself notes that it would
be unacceptable for his account to ground simplicity and strength only by our
psychology. But how to ground them otherwise? And how to balance them
against each other? Lewis proposes to not settle these questions but to avoid
them:
I suppose our standards of simplicity and strength and balance are
only partly a matter of psychology. It’s not because of how we hap-
pen to think that a linear function is simpler than a quartic or a step
function; it’s not because of how we happen to think that a shorter
alternation of prenex quantifiers is simpler than a longer one; and
so on. Maybe some of the exchange rates between aspects of sim-
plicity, etc., are a psychological matter, but not just anything goes.
If nature is kind, the best system will be robustly best – so far ahead
of its rivals that it will come out first under any standards of sim-
plicity and strength and balance. We have no guarantee that nature
is kind in this way, but no evidence that it isn’t. It’s a reasonable
hope. (Lewis, 1994, p.479)
For the time being, let us suppose that it is indeed the case that the best sys-
tem is robustly best, in Lewis’ sense. Of course, for Lewis’ account to be tenable
these central notions would nonetheless need to be made more perspicuous.
However, the above characterisation suffices for the purpose of setting up the
problem with which we are concerned.
Lewis is also committed to Humean Supervenience (HS): “the thesis that
the whole truth about a world like ours supervenes on the spatiotemporal dis-
tribution of local qualities” (Lewis, 1994, p.473) Under HS, the truth-values of
propositions are ultimately determined by the properties instantiated at vari-
ous spacetime points (or something similar).9 In fact, Lewis explicitly says that
9HS is a central tenet of Lewis’ philosophy. Cohen and Callender have (correctly) stressed
that HS is independent of BSA (Cohen and Callender, 2009). But for Lewis, HS is part of the
overall account of laws which he advocates. Lewis acknowledges that HS is not a necessary truth–
there are possible worlds where HS is false–but such worlds are very far from the actual world.
Indeed, in essence, Lewis is committed to the following: the truth-values of common/ordinary
counterfactuals are determined by the relative distances of only HS-worlds to the actual world.
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much of his work can be seen as contributing to the systematic philosophical
position he dubs Humean supervenience:
Many of [my] papers. . . seem to me in hindsight to fall into place
within a prolonged campaign on behalf of the thesis I call “Humean
supervenience”. . . Humean supervenience is named in honor of the
greater denier of necessary connections. It is the doctrine that all
there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular
fact, just one little thing and then another. . . For short: we have an
arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference
without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else super-
venes on that. (Lewis, 1987, pp. ix–x)
On Lewis’ view, then, the laws of nature at a world are determined by the
particular matters of local fact at that world. So the laws of nature at the worlds
relevant to the analysis of a counterfactual are determined by the particular
facts at the relevant worlds. For they (the laws) are the theorems or axioms of
the true deductive system which best summarizes those facts.
Before moving on, let’s say a little bit more about what Lewis means by
a “violation” of a law of nature. This idea was introduced in the previous
section, but we are now in a position to say a little more about it. Consider a
world where it is a law that all Fs are Gs. Now consider a world where there
is one F that isn’t a G. From the perspective of the former world, the latter
world looks like a world with the same laws but with one violation of them.
This isn’t strictly speaking true, since “All Fs are Gs” is not a law of the latter
world: it is not a true generalisation. But there’s an intuitive sense in which
we can understand differences between worlds as violations of the laws of one
world in another world. It is in this sense that we understand Lewis’ talk of
“violations” of laws.
6 The Incongruence of Lewis’ Accounts
Let’s make a distinction between two kinds of closeness of possible worlds: the
notion of closeness at the level of the Humean mosaic; and closeness in terms of
the laws. Let’s call these ‘m-closeness’ and ‘l-closeness’; likewise ‘m-similarity’
and ‘l-similarity’.
Imagine a very simple example of a “Humean mosaic” where every point
in space can either have some property (being “on”) or not (being “off”), like a
monochrome screen displaying a picture. Each point in the mosaic is a “pixel”.
Presumably, whatever Lewis or Lewisians take the mosaic to be, it’s much more
complicated than this, but the analogy will be fruitful. One candidate explica-
tion of what m-similarity between pictures is, is the “Hamming distance”: the
number of pixels you would have to switch from on to off or from off to on
That is, by the relative distances of, to use Lewis’ phrase, worlds which fall within a shell where HS is
true. As we will see, denying HS is one way resolving the incongruence, but one to which Lewis
would not be amenable.
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in order to turn one picture into the other. This is something like the kind of
distance we appealed to in constructing the deviant possible world: the idea
was that the deviant world was different at fewer points in the Humean mosaic
than the standard world was, and was thus closer to the actual. Now imagine
a picture and its “negative”: the picture you get from inverting all of the pixels
from on to off and from off to on. We would intuitively take these pictures
to be very similar, but Hamming distance doesn’t capture this similarity: they
are different at every pixel. So, similarity of pictures displayed on a computer
screen supervenes on the array of pixels displayed. That is, you can’t have a
difference in similarity without a difference in pixels displayed. Despite this
supervenience, similarity of pictures isn’t simply a matter of counting differ-
ences on the pixel-level (i.e. the analog of m-closeness). Similarity of pictures
involves recognising higher-level features that the pictures share or don’t; two
pictures may be more similar to each other than a third, even if the first is
Hamming-distance closer – closer at the level of pixels – to the third than it is
to the second. This response is at first pass intuitively appealing: indeed pic-
tures may be more similar despite Hamming-distance closeness as suggested.
But notice that the claim makes (tacit) recourse to a notion of similiarity other
than that of Hamming-distance. And when it comes to pictures on a screen,
we do have an intuitive idea about what similarity amounts to.
Laws of nature, like pictures on a screen, are built up out of the basic build-
ing blocks (properties at spacetime points, pixels). And like in the case of pic-
tures on a computer screen, similarity of the higher-level objects (the laws of
nature, the pictures) doesn’t reduce straightforwardly to similarity at the lower
level. The difference is that we have a grasp on similarity of pictures, but we
don’t have a grasp on what similarity of the laws is.
The only thing we can say about l-similarity is that it had better not straight-
forwardly supervene on the Humean mosaic of particular local matters of fact
– it better not straightforwardly supervene on m-similarity. Why? If it did, the
deviant world would come out as closer to the actual than the standard, and
thus the counterfactual we were discussing would get the intuitively wrong
truth value.
Lewis seems to suggest that, in reducing counterfactuals to l-similarity of
possible worlds and in reducing laws to the mosaic, he has offered a full ac-
count of the truth values of counterfactuals.
I take [counterfactuals] to be governed by similarity of worlds. . . To
the extent that this similarity consists of perfect match in matters of
particular fact, it supervenes easily on the arrangement of qualities;
and to the extent that it consists of (perfect or imperfect) conformity
by one world to the laws of the other, it supervenes if the laws do.
(Lewis, 1987, p. xii)
However, despite these moves, we are no closer to understanding the right
notion of similarity. Building on the analogy with the Hamming distance in
the simple case, we can get a handle on m-similarity in terms of the number
of properties that need to be modified at each point in the mosaic. And this
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kind of similarity seems to fit with Lewis’ generally reductionist strategy as
captured by his commitment to Humean Supervenience. However, as the pre-
ceding sections show, this is the wrong kind of similarity. And Lewis’ analysis
of lawhood does nothing to help understand what l-similarity is. All we know
about l-similarity is that it doesn’t supervene on m-similarity. It does however
supervene on the “m-facts”, so to speak. The general HS viewpoint seems to
initially suggest that m-similarity would be the right similarity relation. And
m-similarity has the advantage that we have some idea about what it would
mean for worlds to differ more or less in terms of particular local matters of
fact. It turns out that m-similarity isn’t the right similarity relation for assess-
ing the truth values of counterfactuals: Lewis suggests that l-similarity is. But
we have much less grasp on what it means for worlds to differ more or less in
terms of their laws of nature. And Lewis’ reductive account of laws of nature
does not help.
7 Exceptions and the big bad bug
We finished the last section by pointing out that we still don’t really know any-
thing about how similarity in terms of the laws of nature should behave. One
thing that it would be difficult to argue with is that two worlds with the same
laws should be more similar than worlds with different laws. Also uncontro-
versial is the suggestion that worlds with the same laws should be assessed for
similarity by m-similarity (recall Lewis’ hierarchy of aspects of similarity).
In the above we have been rather charitable to Lewis and discussed the best
possible case for his view. Let’s consider two arguably necessary refinements
to Lewis’ picture of laws that make things even harder for his account of coun-
terfactuals. First, consider the case of a ceteris paribus law: a law that has a
clause that rules out unspecified confounding factors or exceptions to the law.
Such a law could be a true generalisation (let’s imagine there’s a way of filling
out this picture that doesn’t make lawhood trivial). Now consider our example
again. The event of the ball floating still and not falling when let go of might
be exactly the sort of exception that the ceteris paribus clause of the law deals
with. In such a situation, it is possible for the three possible worlds we have
been discussing to have the same laws. Now if all three worlds have the same
laws, then there’s no way for Lewis to make the intuitively true counterfactual
come out as true. If anything, it will be false, since the deviant world is as
l-similar as the standard world, and strictly m-closer than it.
Second, consider chancy laws. Again, chancy laws allow exceptions, and
thus our example worlds might all have the same laws and the same conclu-
sion follows. In either case, no amount of playing with the similarity relation
is going allow us to recover the intuitively correct truth value of the counter-
factual. David Lewis was a systematic philosopher, and his system was predi-
cated on the idea of Humean supervenience. HS’s Achilles heel was the notion
of chance; Lewis called chance the “big bad bug”. He worried that incorporat-
ing chances into his system could well pull the whole edifice down.
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There is one big bad bug: chance. It is here, and here alone, that I
fear defeat. But if I am beaten here, then the entire campaign goes
kaput. (Lewis, 1987, p. xiv)
His worry appears to be well-founded.
Note how these examples are working: laws of nature now admit of excep-
tions (for whatever reason). We think of the deviant world as a world with the
same laws where the happenings discussed in the consequent of the counter-
factual are an exception to the law. Such a world has to be closer to the actual
world than the standard world, since actual and deviant share the same laws,
and even if standard also shares the same laws, it is m-further away from the
actual than the deviant world is.
Hawthorne (2005) points to something like this problem, and Williams (2008)
provides a solution that involves modifying the similarity relation to allow
worlds with the same laws to be dis-similar enough to block the deviant worlds
from being salient.
The last section concluded that a robust analysis of similarity with respect
to the laws was missing from Lewis’ program. This section suggests that l-
similarity in fact needs to be replaced with something more sophisticated.
8 Conclusion
Lewis’ account of counterfactuals involves appeal to similarity between possi-
ble worlds. The original – and arguably intuitive – measure of similarity gives
the intuitively wrong truth-values to counterfactuals. So Lewis offered an al-
ternative account of similarity that appealed to laws of nature, and to the size
of the “violation” of the laws required. Lewis argued that the violations of
the laws required for standard possible worlds are smaller than the violations
required for the deviant possible worlds. To return to our ball example, the vi-
olation that you let go of the ball rather than keeping hold of it is smaller than
the violation that you let go of the ball and it just floats there. The intuition is
that in the former case, it’s just a tiny difference in neuron firings (or something
like that) that needs to be different, and then everything else follows the laws,
e.g. gravity. Contrast this with the deviant world where you let go of the ball
but it floats where it is. This involves a bigger and more sustained violation of
a law of nature.
This is an intuitively appealing picture of the situation, but it is not friendly
to the view of laws that Lewis (and many others) endorse according to which
laws are (some sort of) summaries of particular matters of local fact. Specifi-
cally, the intuitively appealing picture of the situation above clearly makes tacit
recourse to the idea that laws bring about that the ball falls when let go of. But
some such ‘bringing about’ is what Lewis’ account of laws denies: the laws of
a possible world don’t bring about that the ball falls when let go of; the laws
merely summarise those particular things that happen. So under a Lewisian
account of laws it is not the case that in the deviant world involves “more” vio-
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lation along the lines that the ball should be subject to the law of gravity. Rather
the ball stays where it is and the laws of this deviant world had better reflect
that fact. Given this, we don’t see much reason to think that a (HS) laws-based
hierarchy of similarity is going to make the standard possible world come out
as closer than the deviant one.
To summarise, Lewis needs to appeal to the notion of l-similarity – sim-
ilarity in terms of the laws of the possible worlds – in order to ground the
correct truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals. Such a notion of simi-
larity doesn’t supervene on similarity at the level of the Humean mosaic – m-
similiarity – and thus is unfriendly to Lewis’ general project of a metaphysics
based on Humean Supervenience. His two accounts are incongruent. The no-
tion of l-similarity is underspecified, but one thing that we do know about it is
that it cannot supervene on m-similarity on pain of getting the truth conditions
wrong for counterfactuals. Further, if laws admit of exceptions – because of
chances, or because of ceteris paribus clauses – then things are much worse: it
becomes difficult to see how to salvage the similarity account.
How to avoid the problem? 0) Bite the bullet and deny our intuitive judg-
ments about the truth-values of counterfactuals. 1) Give up the account of
counterfactuals in terms of the relative similarity of possible worlds to the ac-
tual world. 2) Give up the account of laws of nature (either entirely or by
dropping HS). 3) Further specify the similarity measure.
Let us make some remarks about these potential solutions. 0 seems to us to
be too radical a route. No doubt not all of our intuitions are to be upheld, but
we assume without further argument that (i) is true. What about 1? Lewis’ ac-
count of counterfactuals is well-established and widely used. Therefore giving
this account up would only be acceptable if there were compelling alternative
accounts of counterfactuals, but to our mind there aren’t. So 1 does not look
much better. One could give up on the Lewisian account of laws and have a
modally thick “oomphy” picture of lawhood. Of course this would be very
un-Lewisian but given the many alternatives to BSA, 2 at least seems more
promising than 0 or 1. However, it seems to us that 3 is the most promising way
to avoid the problem given commitement to the truth of the intuitively true
counterfactual and given the individiual appeal of Lewis’ accounts of counter-
factuals and laws. But just how to modify the similiarity measure whilst doing
justice to both remains an open problem.
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